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MAARTEN DE RIJKE 
ABSTRACT. A modal analogue of Lindstrom's characterization of 
first-order logic is proved. Basic modal logics are characterized as 
the only modal logics that have a notion of finite rank, or, equiv-
alently, as the strongest modal logic whose formulas are preserved 
under ultraproducts over w. Also, basic modal logic is the strongest 
classical logic whose formulas are preserved under bisimulations and 
ultraproducts over w. 
1 Introduction 
In the semantics of concurrent programs modal logics are used to give log-
ical descriptions of bisimulations and other notions of process equivalence 
(Hennessy and Milner 1985). Hence, from a computational point of view it 
is important to gain a thorough understanding of the relation between 
modal logic and bisimulations. Independently, the connection between 
equivalence relations on classes of models and notions of logical equiva-
lence is an important topic in abstract model theory (Barwise and Feferman 
1985, Chapter XIX). 
Van Benthem (1976) characterizes modal formulas as the fragment of 
first-order logic whose formulas are preserved by bisimulations between 
models. And De Rijke (1995) shows that two models are modally equival-
ent iff they have bisimilar ultrapowers. The present paper adds a further 
characterization result to this list: it uses bisimulations to prove a modal 
analogue of Lindstrom ( 1969) 's well-known characterization of first-order 
logic. 
Lindstrom's result states that, given a suitable explication of a 'classi-
cal logic', first-order logic is the strongest logic to possess the Compactness 
and Lowenheim-Skolem properties. To prove an analogous characteriza-
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tion result for modal logic we need to agree on a number of things. We 
need to determine the logic we want to characterize; to this end we define 
basic modal logic in §2 below. Next, we have to agree on a notion of ab-
stract modal logic; to this end we introduce bisimulations in §3. Then, in 
§4, we isolate the property distinguishing basic modal logic in addition to 
its invariance for bisimulations: the property of having a notion of finite 
rank. In §5 a notion of abstract modal logic is defined; in this definition 
bisimulations play an essential role. We then prove that basic modal logic 
is the only modal logic that has a notion of finite rank in §6; we show 
that this property is equivalent to preservation under ultraproducts over 
w; as a corollary we find that an abstract classical logic coincides with basic 
modal logic whenever its formulas are preserved under bisimulations and 
ultraproducts over w. We conclude with some comments and questions. 
2 Basic modal logic 
When interpreted on models (as opposed to frames) modal formulas live 
inside a fragment of first-order logic. So to specify a modal language we 
need some notation from first-order logic. We user, r1 , ... to denote (rela-
tional) vocabularies of classical languages; and for r a classical vocabulary, 
a r-structure is a tuple of the form Ql = (A, R, .. . ), where A is a non-empty 
domain, and the Rs interpret all the relation symbols in r; Str[T] denotes 
the class of r-structures. We write Rm to denote the interpretation of R in 
the model Ql. 
Definition 2.1 (Languages) For r a classical vocabulary with unary pred-
icate symbols, the finitary basic modal language over r is the modal lan-
guage denoted BM .C( T) having proposition letters Po, p1 , ..• corresponding 
to the unary predicate symbols in r, and also having n-ary modal operators 
# with patterns specifying their truth-conditions: 
b# = >.x. 3x1 ... 3xn (Rxx1 ... Xn /\ P1 (xi) /\ ... /\ Pn(xn)), 
for every (n + 1)-ary relation symbol R in r. In addition BM.l(T) has the 
usual Boolean connectives, and constants .L and T. 
The standard modal language is BM.C( r) where r only contains a single 
binary predicate R (in addition to a collection of unary predicates); in the 
standard modal language we write 0 ('diamond') rather than # for the 
modal operator. 
Definition 2.2 (Models) We interpret basic modal languages on r-struc-
tures of the form (W,R1 ,R2, ... , P1 ,P2, ... ), where P1 , P2 , ... interpret 
the proposition letters of the modal language. As usual we will let valua-
tions V take care of proposition letters; thus we will write (W, R1 , R2 , ... , 
V), where V (Pi) = P;. Then, the relation Ql, a f= </> is defined as follows: 
Ql, a f= p iff a E V (p) 
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2!, a f= ..l iff a =f:. a 
2!, a f= T iff a = a 
2!, a f= ..,q; iff 2l, a ~ <P 
2l, a f= <P /\ 1/J iff 2l, a f= <P and Ql, a f= 'If; 
2l, a f= #(</J1, ... , c/>n) iff 3b1 ... bn (R#ab1 ... bn /\ /\i(2!, b; f= </;;)). 
As an aside, using the above truth definition, a translation ST can be 
defined that takes modal formulas to formulas in the classical language in 
which those patterns live. The translation ST maps proposition letters 
onto unary predicates, it commutes with the Booleans, and to translate 
modal operators it uses their patterns. The result is that for all modal 
formulas<;&: (W,R1,R2, ... ,V),a f= ef>iff (W,Ri,R2 ,. .. ,V) f= ST(cf>)[a] 
(Benthem 1976). 
Convention 2.3 Throughout this paper models for modal languages are 
always pointed models of the form (2l, a), where 2l is a relational structure 
and a is an element of 2l (its distinguished point) at which evaluation takes 
place. 
Our main reasons for adopting this convention are the following. First, 
the basic semantic unit in modal logic simply is a structure together with 
a distinguished node at which evaluation takes place. Second, some of 
the results below admit smoother formulations when we adopt the local 
perspective of pointed models. Of course, this local perspective dates back 
(at least) to Kripke's original publication (Kripke 1963). The usual global 
perspective ('2! f= <P iff for all a in Ql: 2!, a f= ef>') is obviously definable 
using the local point of view. 
3 Bisimulations 
In this section we define bisimulations. One of the defining properties of 
an abstract classical logic is the Isomorphism property which states that 
it is impossible to distinguish isomorphic structures by means of formulas 
from the abstract logic. In abstract modal logic this property is replaced 
by a Bisimilarity property which states that bisimilar structures are be 
indistinguishable by modal means. In addition to this, bisimulations will 
play an important role below as a technical tool. 
Definition 3.1 (Bisimulations) For T a classical vocabulary and 2l, Q3 E 
Str[r], we say that (2l,a) and (Q3,b) are r-bisimilar, (2l,a) ='T (~,b), 
if there exists a non-empty relation Z between the elements of 2l and 25 
(called a r-bisimulation, and written Z: (2l,a) ~'T (~,b)) such that the 
following hold. 
1. Z links the distinguished points of (2l, a) and(~, b): Zab. 
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2. For all unary predicate symbols P in r and a0 in 2l and bo in 1)3, 
Zaobo implies ao E P 91 iff b0 E p'13. 
3. If Zaobo, ai, ... , an E 2l and (a0 , a 1 , ... ,an) E R 21 , then there are b1, 
... , bn E 1)3 such that (b0 , b1, ... , bn) E R'13 and Za;b;, where 1 :Si :S 
n and R is an ( n + 1 )-ary relation symbol in T (Jorth condition). 
4. If Zaobo, b1 , ••. ,bn E 1)3 and (b0 ,b1, ... ,bn) E R'13, then there are 
a1, ... , an E 2l such that (ao,a 1, ... ,an) E R'll and Za;b;, where 
1 :S i :S n and R is an ( n+ 1 )-ary relation symbol in r (back condition). 
Many familiar constructions on relational structures arise as special ex-
amples of bisimulations: isomorphisms, disjoint unions, p-morphism, and 
generated submodels. For the first three the reader is referred to Gold-
blatt (1987) for definitions; as we will need generated submodels in the 
sequel, we will define that construction here. 
(2l, a) is a generated submodel of (1}3, b) whenever (i) a = b, (ii) the 
domain of Qt is a subset of the domain of 1)3, (iii) R2J. is simply the restriction 
of Rp, to 2l, and (iv) if ao E l.2l and R'13 aob1 ... bn, then b1 , ... , bn are in 2l. 
If X is a subset of the domain of 2l, then the sztbmodel generated by X is 
the smallest generated submodel of Qt whose domain includes X; if X is a 
singleton {a} we simply refer to the submodel generated by a rather than 
{a}. If (2l,a) is a generated submodel of (1}3,b), there is a r-bisimulation 
Z: (2l, a) ~r (1}3, b) defined by Zxy iff x = y. 
Definition 3.2 (In-degree) For 2l a model, c in 2l, the in-degree of c is 
[{aE 2l<w I :JR Er, i > 1 ( c =a; and R 21 a1 .. . a; ... an)}[. 
Thus, the in-degree of c is the number of times it occurs as an argument 
in a relation: Rx . .. c .... 
Definition 3.3 (Depth) The second notion we need measures the distance 
from a given element in a model to its distinguished point. Let (2l, a) be a 
T-structure; the r-hulls H;: around a are defined as follows 
• H$(2l,a)={a}, 
• H.;:'+1(21.,a) = H.;:'(l.2l,a) U {bin l.2l [ for some RE r, u E H.;:'(2l,a) 
and v1 , ... , Vn in 2l: b is one of the v; and R21 uv1 ... Vn}. 
So, the r-hull H~' around a contains all elements in Qt that can be reached 
from a in at most n relational steps. 
For c in (2l, a), the depth of c in (2l, a) is the smallest n such that 
c E H.;:'(2l, a). 
For n E w, the model (Qt r n, a) is the restriction of (2l, a) to points of 
depth n; it is defined as the submodel of (2l, a) whose domain is Hn(2l, a). 
Below we will want to get models that have nice properties, such as a 
low in-degree or finite depth for each of its elements. To obtain such models 
A LINDSTROM THEOREM FOR MODAL LOGIC I 221 
the notion of forcing comes in handy. Fix a vocabulary r. A property P of 
models is '::::!.r-enforceable, or enforceable, iff for every (Qt, a) E Str[r], there 
is a ('l3, b) E Str[r] with (2l, a) ':::2 7 ('l3, b) and ('l3, b) has P. 
Proposition 3.4 The property ''every element has finite depth" is enforce-
able. 
Proof. Let 2l E Str[r]. Let (i:B,a) be the submodel of Qt whose do-
main is Un H;-(2l, a). In ('l3, a) every element has finite depth. Moreover, 
(2l, a) '::::!.r ('l3, a). D 
Proposition 3.5 below generalizes the unraveling construction from stan-
dard modal logic with a single diamond 0 (Sahlqvist 1975) to arbitrary 
vocabularies. 
Proposition 3.5 The property "every element has in-degree at most 1" is 
enforceable. 
Proof. We may assume that (2l, a) is generated by a. Expand T to a 
vocabulary r+ that has constants c for all elements c in Qt. Define a path 
conjunction to be a first-order formula that is a conjunction of closed atomic 
formulas (over r+) taken from the smallest set X such that 
(i)a=aisinX; 
(ii) (a = a) /\ Rac1 ... Cn is in X for any R and c1 , ... , en such that 
R 21 ac1 ... Cn; 
(iii) if O' /\ Rcc1 .. . en is in X and for some Sandi, S 21 c;d1 ... dm, then 
the conjunction D' /\ Rcc1 ... en /\ Sca1 ... dm is in X. 
A path conjunction O' = 0'1 /\ Sdd 1 ••. dm is admissible for a constant c in 
r+ \ T if c is one of the d; occurring in the last conjunct of O'. 
Define a model 'l3 whose domain contains, for every constant c in r+ \ T, 
a copy Ca, for every O' that is admissible for c. Define 
R 'l3- -1 -n ·ff _ - - R-1 -n Ca Ca 1 •.• Ca,, l 0'1 = ... = O'n = O' /\ CC .•. C . 
And define a valuation V' on i:B by putting Ca E V'(p) iff c E V(p). Finally, 
define a relation Z between Qt and 'l3 by putting Zxy iffy = Xa for some 
path conjunction a. Then Z: (2l,a) '::::!.r (i:B,aa:=a:} D 
A short historical note to conclude this section: in modal logic bisim-
ulations were introduced by Van Benthem (1976) as p-relations. In the 
computational tradition bisimulations date back to Park (1981). In essence 
bisimulations are trimmed down versions of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra!sse games 
found in classical logic (Barwise and Feferman 1985). Further references, 
on modal and computational aspects of bisimulations, can be found in Van 
Benthem and Bergstra (1993). 
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4 Properties of basic modal logic 
We will characterize basic modal logic by showing that it is the only modal 
logic satisfying a modal counterpart of the original Lindstrom conditions: 
having a notion of finite rank. First, we need to show that modal formulas 
are invariant under bisimulations. 
For BM£(7) a basic modal language over 7, let (2l,a) =BM.C(T) ('B,b) 
denote that (2l,a) and (IB,b) satisfy the same BM.C(7)-formulas. 
Proposition 4.1 Let 7 be a classical vocabulary, and let BM£(7) be a 
basic modal language over 7. Then t:!T ~ =sM.c(T)· 
One of the distinguishing features of basic modal logic is that it has a 
notion of finite rank which gives a fixed upperbound on the depth of the 
elements that need to be considered to verify a formula. 
Definition 4.2 (Basic modal rank) Define the rank of a basic modal for-
mula, rank(<P), as follows: 
rank(p) 0 
rank( -..<f>) 
rank( et> /\ 'lf!) 
rank(#(<P1, ... , cPn)) 
= rank(ct>) 
max( {rank( et>), rank( 'ljJ)}) 
1+max{rank(<Pi)I1::; i::; n}. 
Proposition 4.3 Let</> be a basic modal formula with rank( et>) ::; n. Then 
(2l, a) I= et> iff (2l In, a) I= cP· 
We write (2l,a) =aM.C(T) ('B,b) for (2l,a) and (IB,b) verify the same 
BMC( 7)-formulas of rank at most n. 
Lemma 4.4 Let 7 be a finite vocabulary. Then, modulo logical equivalence, 
there are only finitely many basic modal formulas with a fixed finite rank. 
Proof. The proof is by a induction on rank. For n = 0, there are only 
finitely many proposition letters. For the induction step, choose a set E 
of modal formulas of rank ::; n such that every every such formula has 
an equivalent in E. Now consider disjunctive normal forms over 'atoms' 
#1 (</>11' ... , </>mi), ... , #k(cPkp ... , <f>m1J, where all </>j are in E and the #1, 
... , #k are all the modal operators in the finite language. D 
Proposition 4.5 Let 7 be a finite vocabulary. Let (2l, a), ('B, b) be two 
models such that every element has in-degree at most 1 and depth at most 
n. If (2l,a) =aM.c(T) (IB,b), then (2l,a) 't:!T ('B,b). 
Proof Define Z ~ A x B by 
xZy iff depth(x) = depth(y) = m and (2l, x) =~M~(T) (IB, y). 
We claim that Z: (2l,a) t:!T (IB,b). To prove this, we only show the forth 
condition. Assume xZy and R21xx1 ..• xk, where depth(x) = depth(y) = 
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m. Then n - m ~ 1. Let # be the modal operator whose semantics is 
based on R. 
As T is finite there are only finitely many non-equivalent formulas of 
rank at most n-m -1. Let 'l/Ji be the conjunction of all non-equivalent basic 
modal formulas of rank at most n - m - 1 that are true at x; (1 :Si :S k). 
Then (2l, x) I= #( 'l/11, ... , 1/Jk) and #('1J>i, ... , ?f-1k) has rank n - m. Hence, 
as xZy, (113,,y) I= #(1);1, ... ,'l/Jk). So there exist y1, ... , Yk in 113 such that 
R'BYY1 ... Yk and (113, y;) f= 'l/Ji (1 :Si :S k). 
Now, as all states have in-degree at most 1, depth(x;) = depth(y;) = 
m + 1 and (2l, xi) =~:j~1(:~) (113, y;) (1 :Si :S k). Hence (2l, x;) "':.!r (113, y;). 
This proves the forth condition. O 
5 Abstract modal logic 
Lindstrom's Theorem starts from a definition of an abstract classical logic 
as a pair ( .C, f= L) consisting of a set of formulas .C and a satisfaction relation 
l=c between .C-structures and .C-formulas that satisfies three 'book keeping' 
conditions, an Isomorphism property, and a Relativization property which 
allows one to consider definable submodels (cf. Chang and Keisler Chang 
and Keisler 1973, Definition 2.5.1). Then, an abstract logic extending first-
order logic coincides with first-order logic iff it satisfies the Compactness 
and Lowenheim-Skolem properties. We will now set up our modal analogue 
of Lindstrom's Theorem along similar lines. 
Somewhat analogous to an abstract classical logic an abstract modal 
logic is characterized by three properties: two book keeping properties, 
and a Bisimilarity property to replace the Isomorphism property. 
Definition 5.1 (Abstract modal logic) An abstract modal logic is a pair 
(.C, l=d with the following properties; .C is its set of formulas, and l=c is 
its satisfaction relation, that is, a relation between (pointed) models and 
.C-formulas. 
(i) Occurrence property. For each tj> in .C there is an associated finite lan-
guage .C(Tq,). The relation (2l, a) l=i: tj> is a relation between .C-formulas tj> 
and structures (2l, a) for languages L containing L( Tq,). That is, if tj> is in 
£, and 2l is an .C-model, then the statement (2l, a) l=c tj> is either true or 
false if .C contains £(rq,), and undefined otherwise. 
(ii) Expansion property. The relation (2l, a) f= c c/> depends only on the 
reduct of2l to £(r<1>)· That is, if (2l,a) f=c tj> and (113,a) is an expansion of 
(2l, a) to a larger language, then (113, b) I= c tj>. 
(iii) Bisimilarity property. The relation (2l, a) l=c ef> is preserved under 
basic bisimulations: if (21., a) '.::± r (1.B, b) and (2l, a) l=c ef>, then (113, b) I= c ef>. 
A few remarks are in order. First, to define an abstract modal logic 
we only need two bookkeeping properties (the Occurrence and Expansion 
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properties), whereas more are usually needed to define an abstract classical 
logic; in particular we don't need modal counterparts of the Renaming and 
Relativization properties (Barwise and Feferman 1985, pages 27-31, Chang 
and Keisler 1973, page 128). 
Comparing the above definition to the list of properties defining an 
abstract classical logic, we see that it's the Bisimilarity property that de-
termines the modal character of an abstract modal logic. 
Remark 5.2 Recall that Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) has modal 
operators (a), where o: is taken from some index set, and x f= (a)efJ iff 
for some y, both Rc,xy and y f= </>. Thus the pattern for modal operators 
(a) is just the basic modal one from Definition 2.1. PDL-formulas are 
preserved under bisimulations that respect all the relations Ra. So PDL 
is an example of an abstract modal logic. 
The language of standard temporal logic has operators F, with x f= F</> 
iff for some y, both Rxy and y f= </J, and P, with x f= P</> iff for some y, 
both Ryx and y f= <f>. The pattern for F is just a basic modal pattern in 
the sense of Definition 2.1, but the one for P isn't. As this language 'looks 
back and forth' along the relation R it violates the Bisimilarity property, 
hence it is not a abstract modal logic. 
Next, we need to say what we mean by '(£, f=c) extends basic modal 
logic' and by closure under negation. 
Definition 5.3 We say that (£, f=c) extends basic modal logic if for every 
basic modal formula there exists an equivalent £-formula, that is, if for 
each basic modal formula </> there exists an £-formula ·If; such that for any 
model (Qt, a), (Ql,a) f= <P iff (21, a) f=c 'l/J. 
We say that (£, f=c) is closed under negation if for all £-formulas </> 
there exists an £-formula •</> such that for all models (Qt, a), (Qt, a) f= <P iff 
(Qt, a) ~ •</J. 
PDL is an example of an abstract modal logic that extends basic modal 
logic. 
Logics in the sense of Definition 5.1 deal with the same class of pointed 
models as basic modal logic, and only the formulas and satisfaction relation 
may be different. This implies, for example, that intuitionistic logic or the 
nominal modal logic of (Blackburn 1993), whose repertoire contains special 
proposition symbols, is not an abstract modal logic: their models need 
to satisfy special constraints. The original Lindstrom characterization of 
first-order logic suffers from similar limitations (by not allowing w-logic as 
a logic, for example). 
We will use the property of having a finite rank to single out the (finitary) 
basic modal language !3M£ among its extensions. 
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Definition 5.4 (Finite rank) An abstract modal logic has a notion of 
finite rank if there is a function rankc: .C--+ w such that for all (2t.,a), all 
<P in .C, 
(2t., a) l=c <P iff ((2t., a) r rankc(q))), a l=c q). 
Observe that by Proposition 4.3 BM.C has a notion of finite rank. 
If £ extends basic modal logic, we assume that rankc behaves reg-
ularly with respect to standard modal operators and proposition letters. 
That is, for # a modal operator as defined in §2, rankc(p) = 0 and 
rankc(#(<P1, ... , </>n)) = 1+max{rankc(c/>i)I1:::; i:::; n}. 
Two models (2t., a) and (i:B, b) for the same language are £-equivalent if 
for every <Pin .C, (2t., a) I= cl> iff (i:B, b) I= cf>. 
Remark 5.5 Having a finite rank is a very restrictive property, which is 
not implied by the finite model property (FMP). To see this recall that 
PDL has the FMP: it has the property that every satisfiable formula</> is 
satisfiable on a model of size at most 14>1 3 , where cl> is the length of </>, cf. 
Goldblatt (1987). However, it does not have a notion of finite rank. To see 
this, consider the model (w, Ra, V), where Ra is the successor relation and 
Vis an arbitrary valuation, and let cl>= [a*](a}T; clearly (w,Ra, V),O I=</>. 
But for non E w does the restriction (w, Ra, V) r n satisfy <Pat 0. It follows 
that PDL does not have a notion of finite rank. 
6 Characterizing modal logic 
We are almost ready now to prove our characterization result. The follow-
ing lemma is instrumental. 
Lemma 6.1 Let (£, l=c) be an abstract modal logic which is closed under 
negation. Assume .C has a notion of finite rank rankc. Let <P be an £-
formula with rankc(<P) = n. Then, for any two models (2t., a), (i:B, b) such 
that (Ql,a) =aMc (i:B,b), (2t.,a) l=c </>implies (i:B,b) l=c <f>. 
Proof. Assume that the conclusion of the Lemma does not hold. Let (2t., a), 
(i:B, b) be such that (Ql, a) =8Mc (i:B, b) but (Ql, a) l=c </>and (i:B, b) l=c -iq). 
By the Occurrence and Expansion properties we may assume that L = 
C(r,p), where .C(r,p) is the finite language in which</> lives. 
By Proposition 3.5 we can assume that (2t., a) and (i:B, b) have in-degree 
at most l. Then (Ql f n, a) :=BMC (i:B f n, b), and (Ql f n, a) i=c </> but 
(i:B r n, b) l=c -i<fl. In addition (2t. r n, a) and (i:B r n, b) both have in-degree 
1. By Proposition 4.5 it follows that (2t. r n, a) ~.,."' (i:B r n, b) - but now 
we have a contradiction as (2t. r n, a) and (i:B r n, b) are bisimilar but don't 
agree on <f>. D 
Theorem 6.2 Let (.C, l=c) extend basic modal logic. If(£, l=c) has a no-
tion of finite rank, then it is equivalent to the basic modal logic BM.C. 
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Proof. We must show that every .C-formula </> is .C-equivalent to a basic 
modal formula 1/J, that is, for all (2t,a}, (2t,a} f=.c </> iff (2l,a) f=.c 1/J. 
As before, by the Occurrence and Expansion properties we may restrict 
ourselves to a finite language. Moreover, </> has a basic modal equivalent 
iff it has such an equivalent with the same rank; so we have to locate the 
equivalent we are after among the basic modal formulas whose rank equals 
the .C-rank of</>. 
Assume n = rank.c(</>). By Lemma 4.4 there are only finitely many 
(non-equivalent) basic modal formulas whose rank equals n; assume that 
they are all contained in r n. It suffices to show the following 
(1) if (2t,a), (l.B,b} agree on all formulas in rn. then they agree on</>. 
For then, </>will be equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas in r n· 
To see this reason as follows. The relation 'satisfies the same formulas in 
r n' is an equivalence relation on the class of all models; as r n is finite, 
there can only be finitely many equivalence classes. Choose representatives 
(2l1,a1), ... , (2tm,am), and for each i, with 1 :$ i :$ m, let 1/J; be the 
conjunction of all formulas in r n that are satisfied by (2t;, a;). Then </> is 
equivalent to V {1/J; I (2l;, a;) f=.c </> }. 
Now to conclude the proof of the theorem we need only observe that 
condition (1) is exactly the content of Lemma 6.1. 0 
Our next aim is to present a more algebraic version of Theorem 6.2. This 
alternative formulation is based on an observation due to Ian Hodkinson 
that having a notion of finite rank is equivalent to being preserved under 
suitable ultraproducts. 
We need two lemmas. 
Lemma 6.3 Let r be a countable vocabulary. For each n E w, let (2ln, an) 
and (I.En, bn} be r-models with (21n, an) =BM.C (l13n, bn)· Let U be a 
non-principal ultrafilter. Then the ultraproducts (TI 2tn/U, TI an/U) and (TI l.Bn/U, TI bn/U) are r-bisimilar. 
Proof. By Los' Theorem (TI 2ln/U, II an/U) and (TI l.Bn/U, TI bn/U) agree 
on all modal formulas. By (Chang and Keisler 1973, Chapter 6) the 
two ultraproducts are w1-saturated. From these two facts it follows that 
(II2ln/U,Tian/U) !::!,. (Til13n/U,IIbn/U). (See De Rijke (1995) for de-
tails.) 0 
Lemma 6.4 Let (.C, f=.c) be an abstract modal logic that is closed under 
negation. The following are equivalent. 
1. (.C, f=.c) has a notion of finite rank. 
2. C-formulas are preserved under ultraproducts over w. That is: if</> is 
an C-formula, and for each i E w, (2t;, a;) is a model with (2l;, a;) f=.c 
</>, then, for any ultrafilter U over w, (II 21;/U, TI a;/U) f=.c <f>. 
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Proof. To prove the implication 2 => 1, assume that .C-formulas are pre-
served under ultraproducts over w, but that Chas no notion of finite rank; 
we will derive a contradiction. As .C does not have a notion of finite rank, 
there is an .C-formula </> 'without rank', that is: there exists </> such that for 
all i E w there is a Tq,-model (2l;,a;) with 
(2l;,a;) l=c </> iff (2l; ri,a;) l=c -i</J. 
(The restriction to T<f> uses the Expansion and Occurrence properties.) 
Now, let U be a non-principal ultrafilter over w, and consider the ul-
traproducts 'l3 = (TI 2l;/U, I1 a;/U) and '13' = (Il(2l; r i)/U, IJ a;/U). We 
want to show that 
(2) 'l3 l=c <P iff '13' l=c -i</>. 
To see this, take an S E U such that for all i E Sit holds that (2l;, a;) l=c </> 
but (2l; r i, a;) F==c -i<f>. Let U' = {X n s Ix E U}. Then 
23 ~err 2l;/U', II a;/U') F=c <P 
iES iES 
and 
'l3' ~err (2li r i)/U', IT a;/U') l=c -i</>, 
iES iES 
and this establishes (2). As (2l;, a;) =hMc (2l; [ i, a;) for all i E w, it 
follows from Lemma 6.3 that 23 ~ Tq, '13'. But because 23 and '13' don't 
agree on </> by (2), this is a contradiction. 
For the implication 1 => 2, assume .C has a notion of finite rank. Let <P 
be an .C-formula. Suppose that for all i E w, (2l;, a;) l=c </>,and let Ube an 
ultrafilter over w. We have to show that (Il 2l;/U, II a;/U) l=c </>. By the 
Expansion and Occurrence properties we can work in a finite vocabulary 
T<f>· Assume that rankc(</>) = n. Then (2l; r n,a;) l=c </>,for all i E w. 
As Tep is finite, there are finitely many first-order sentences a 1 , ... , ak 
(involving constants to denote the distinguished point of each model) such 
that any model of depth n satisfies one of a 1 , ... , aki and such that for 
any j (1 ~ j ~ k) any two models of Ctj are Tq,-bisimilar. It follows that 
for some j, with 1 :'.S j ~ k, the sets= {i E w I (2l; r n,a;) l=c Oj} is in 
U. Therefore eIJ(2l; r n)/U, IJ a;/U) f=c aj. And this in turn implies that 
for any s ES 
(3) 
As (2ls f n, s) l=c </>, (3) implies that (Il(2l; f n)/U, IJ a;/U) f=c </>. Finally, 
as 
err (2l; r n)/U, II a;/U) =((II 2l;/U) r n, II a;/U), 
we conclude that ((IJ 2l;/U) r n, TI a;/U) l=c </>, and so we get the desired 
result: err 2l;/U, TI a;/U) l=c </>. 0 
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Theorem 6.5 Let ([,, f=.c) extend basic modal logic. If £-formulas are 
preserved under ultraproducts over w, then ([,, f=.c) is equivalent to the 
basic modal logic BMC 
Proof. By Theorem 6.2 and Lemma 6.4. 0 
Our next aim is to situate basic modal logic among the classical logics, 
rather than in the class of all abstract modal logics. According to some 
definitions of abstract classical logics, abstract modal logics don't qualify as 
classical logics (see for example Chang and Keisler ( 1973, page 130)). If we 
adopt a definition of abstract classical logic that does include our abstract 
modal logics (Barwise and Feferman (1985, Chapter II) list some possibil-
ities), the following is immediate from Definition 5.1 and Theorem 6.5. 
Theorem 6.6 Let [, be an abstract classical logic extending basic modal 
logic. If [,-formulas are invariant for bisimulations and preserved under 
ultra products over w, then [, is equivalent to the basic modal logic BM [.. 
To conclude this section we briefly discuss examples and extensions of the 
above results. 
Specific vocabularies 
First of all, in the proof of the Lindstrom Theorem the basic modal formula 
V' that is found as the equivalent of the abstract modal formula </> is in the 
same vocabulary as </>. This means, for example, that the only abstract 
modal logic over a binary relation that has a notion of finite rank is the 
standard modal logic with a single modal operator 0. 
Beyond the basic pattern 
So far we have only covered the basic modal pattern consisting of a finite 
prefix of existential quantifiers followed by a conjunction of atomic formu-
las; in some cases extensions beyond this pattern can easily be obtained. 
As a first example, consider the standard temporal language with op-
erators F and P, where x f= Fp (x f= Pp) iff for some y, Rxy and y f= </> 
(Ryx and y f= </> ). Consider temporal bisimulations in which one not only 
looks forward along the binary relation, but also backward, and adopt the 
notion of depth accordingly. Given the obvious definition of an abstract 
temporal logic, standard temporal logic is the only temporal logic over a 
single binary relation that has a notion of finite rank. 
By tinkering with the notion of model and, more specifically, by allowing 
models with constraints on the values assigned to certain atomic symbols, 
one can obtain a Lindstrom style characterization of, for example, nominal 
modal logic in which special atomic symbols called nominals are constrained 
to denote (at most) a singleton. 
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1 Discussion 
In this paper we gave a Lindstrom style characterization of basic modal 
logic starting from the assumption that bisimulations are a fundamental 
tool in the model theory of modal logic. Extensions of our result to lan-
guages beyond the basic modal format were briefly discussed, but a lot 
remains to be done. Here are some open issues. 
In his important 1969 paper, Lindstrom proves that whenever .C is a 
classical logic that has the Lowenheim-Skolem property and is recursively 
enumerable for validity, then .C is effectively included in first-order logic. 
What about a modal analogue of this result? 
Another question is to give Lindstrom style characterization results for 
modal languages differing from the basic modal language, such as PDL. 
In an unpublished manuscript Albert Visser considers bisimulations and 
notions of rank fine-tuned for dealing with models that have special prop-
erties, such as reflexivity or transitivity. It remains to be seen to which 
extent the results of this paper can be extended to that setting. 
As basic modal logic has the finite model property, it follows from our 
main result that whenever an abstract modal logic extends basic modal 
logic and has a notion of finite rank, then it has the finite model property 
- but what is the general relation between the two properties? And, which 
modal logic is the strongest modal logic with the FMP? 
Further, in a recent manuscript Johan van Benthem characterizes the 
(first-order) formulas defining operations on relations that preserve bisim-
ilarity. What is the connection between this 'safety result' and the charac-
terization results obtained here? 
And finally, throughout this paper we have concentrated on pointed 
models with a distinguished element for evaluation. This suggests that the 
classical languages in which our modal languages live be equipped with 
a constant to denote the distinguished point. And this, in turn, suggests 
that one adds an operator like Hans Kamp's NOW to our modal languages, 
where x I= NOW <P iff for a the distinguished point of the model one has 
a I= q,. In a recent manuscript Johan van Benthem shows that the standard 
modal results and techniques go through in this extended format; what 
about our characterization result? 
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